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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 The “prior publication” exclusion of liability insurance 
contracts prevents a company from obtaining ongoing 
insurance coverage for a continuing course of tortious 
conduct.  In this appeal, we consider the scope of the “prior 
publication” exclusion.    
 
I. 
 On February 28, 2012, in the U.S. District Court in 
New Mexico, the Navajo Nation and its affiliates (collectively 
Navajo Nation) sued Urban Outfitters and its affiliates 
(collectively Urban Outfitters) for trademark infringement 
and related common law and statutory violations.  Navajo 
Nation’s central allegation was that Urban Outfitters 
“advertised, promoted, and sold its goods under the ‘Navaho’ 
and ‘Navajo’ names and marks” on the Internet and in retail 
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stores “[s]ince at least March 16, 2009.”1  Urban Outfitters 
tendered the complaint to OneBeacon America Insurance 
Company and Hanover Insurance Company. 
 
 OneBeacon provided commercial general liability and 
umbrella liability coverage to Urban Outfitters prior to July 7, 
2010.  The Insuring Agreement specifically included 
“personal and advertising injury” coverage.2  On July 7, 2010, 
                                              
1 On September 19, 2014, after years of discovery and three 
amended complaints, the District Court in New Mexico 
dismissed Urban Outfitters’ counterclaim seeking a judicial 
declaration that Navajo Nation’s federally registered 
NAVAJO trademarks are invalid and therefore subject to 
cancellation.  On March 23, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit denied permission for interlocutory 
appeal.  Currently pending before the District Court in New 
Mexico are various motions and cross-motions, including 
motions for summary judgment. 
2 “Personal and advertising injury” was defined in the policy, 
in pertinent part, as 
 (2) Oral or written publication, in any 
manner, of material that disparages a person’s 
or organization’s goods, products or services.  
 This does not include any disparagement 
related to the actual or  alleged infringement 
or violation of any intellectual property rights 
 or laws; 
e. Oral or written publication of material that 
violates a person’s right of privacy; 
f.  The use of another’s advertising idea in your 
“advertisement”; or 
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OneBeacon issued a “fronting policy”3 to Urban Outfitters 
providing identical coverage for which Hanover served as the 
responsible insurer.  The policy was in effect from July 7, 
2010, to July 7, 2011.  Hanover subsequently issued separate 
commercial general liability and umbrella liability policies to 
Urban Outfitters, which were effective from July 7, 2011, to 
July 7, 2012.  The “fronting policy” and Hanover-issued 
policies excluded coverage for “personal and advertising 
injury” liability “arising out of oral or written publication of 
material whose first publication took place before the 
beginning of the policy period.”4 
 
 On April 26, 2012, two months after Navajo Nation 
filed the trademark infringement suit, Hanover provided a 
reservation of rights letter, informing Urban Outfitters of 
Hanover and OneBeacon’s joint retention of defense counsel.  
On July 12, 2012, Hanover sought a judicial declaration in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
that it was not responsible for Urban Outfitters’ defense or 
indemnification.  On August 19, 2013, the District Court 
granted Hanover’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 
                                                                                                     
g. Infringing upon another’s copyright, trade 
dress or slogan in your “advertisement”. 
3 A “fronting policy” is a risk management technique in 
which an insurer underwrites a policy to cover a specific risk 
but then cedes the risk to a reinsurer.  See Douglas R. 
Richmond, Getting a Fix on Fronting Policies, 31 No. 19 Ins. 
Litig. Rep. 629 (2009).  Here, the fronting company is One 
Beacon and the reinsurer is Hanover. 
4 See J.A. at 198, 224. 
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 The District Court held that Hanover had no duty to 
defend or indemnify since Hanover did not begin insurance 
coverage of Urban Outfitters until sixteen months after the 
alleged infringement began.  The District Court found that, 
because the claims in the underlying action alleged injuries 
stemming from advertisements published prior to the policy 
inception date, any resulting injury fell within the Hanover 
policies’ “prior publication” exclusions.5  We dismissed an 
initial appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.6  However, the 
District Court has since addressed our jurisdictional concern 
by entering final judgment for Hanover on its August 19, 
2013, Order, pursuant to Rule 54(b). Urban Outfitters and 
Third Party Defendant, OneBeacon, now appeal that order. 
 
II.7 
 “We review de novo an order granting judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”8  “[I]n reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(c) 
motion, we must view the facts presented in the pleadings and 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.”9  Under Pennsylvania 
law, which Hanover and Urban Outfitters agree governs, 
                                              
5 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters, No. 12-cv-3961, 2013 
WL 4433440, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2013). 
6 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters Inc., 572 F. App’x 91, 
93 (3d Cir. 2014). 
7 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
8 In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. 
(No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 156 n.11 (3d Cir. 2014). 
9 Id. at 154 n.4 (quotation marks omitted). 
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“[t]he interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of 
law that we will review de novo.”10 
 
III. 
 Urban Outfitters contends that the District Court erred 
in finding that Navajo Nation’s trademark infringement 
allegations fall under the Hanover policies’ “prior 
publication” exclusions.  Both sides acknowledge an absence 
of binding authority, and urge us to derive antithetical lessons 
from the few cases on point.  For the reasons which follow, 
we will affirm the District Court’s decision. 
 
A. 
 In interpreting an insurance contract, 
[o]ur inquiry is straightforward.  We look first 
to the terms of the policy which are a 
manifestation of the “intent of the parties.”  
[Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v.] Baumhammers, 938 
A.2d [286,] 290 [(Pa. 2007)].  “When the 
language of the policy is clear and 
unambiguous, we must give effect to that 
language.”  Id.  . . .  Next, we compare the terms 
of the policy to the allegations in the underlying 
claim.  “It is well established that an insurer’s 
duties under an insurance policy are triggered 
by the language of the complaint against the 
insured.”  Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896.  In 
                                              
10 Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006). 
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determining the existence of a duty to defend, 
the factual allegations of the underlying 
complaint against the insured are to be taken as 
true and liberally construed in favor of the 
insured.11 
  
An insurer that disavows its duty to defend by reference to a 
policy exclusion effectively “assert[s] an affirmative defense 
and, accordingly, bears the burden of proving such 
defense.”12 
 
 The Hanover policies’ “personal and advertising 
injury” provisions clearly and unambiguously cover Urban 
Outfitters’ alleged trademark infringement and related 
common law and statutory violations.13  Nonetheless, 
Hanover contends that it has no duty to defend since its 
policies specifically excluded coverage for “personal and 
advertising injury” liability “arising out of oral or written 
publication of material whose first publication took place 
before the beginning of the policy period.”  The “fronting 
policy” under which Hanover first assumed responsibility for 
Urban Outfitters’ liability coverage became effective on July 
7, 2010.  Thus, we must determine whether Urban Outfitters’ 
liability-triggering conduct preceded or postdated that policy 
period’s inception. 
                                              
11 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. CPB Int’l, Inc., 562 F.3d 591, 
595-96 (3d Cir. 2009) (footnote and, in final sentence only, 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
12 Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 
A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999). 
13 See supra note 2. 
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 The answer lies entirely within the four corners of the 
underlying complaint.14  There Navajo Nation alleged that 
Urban Outfitters engaged in “trademark infringement, 
trademark dilution, unfair competition, false advertising, 
commercial practices laws violations, and [] violation of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act,”15 but offered little specificity as 
to when the offensive conduct occurred.  Navajo Nation’s 
relevant allegations are as follows: 
 
 2. Since at least March 16, 2009, 
Urban Outfitters has advertised, promoted, and 
sold its goods under the “Navaho” and 
“Navajo” names and marks. Urban Outfitters 
offers these goods on the Internet and in stores 
across the United States, and they compete 
directly with the Navajo Nation’s goods.16 
 
*** 
 
 37. At least as early as March 16, 
2009, Urban Outfitters started using the 
                                              
14 See Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 
290-91 (Pa. 2007); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Fidler, 808 A.2d 587, 
590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“The obligation of an insurer to 
defend an action against the insured is fixed solely by the 
allegations in the underlying complaint.”). 
15 J.A. at 748.  All citations to Navajo Nation’s complaint 
refer to the First Amended Complaint, which governed when 
Hanover filed the declaratory judgment action presently on 
appeal.  Subsequent amendments do not substantively alter 
any relevant allegations. 
16 J.A. at 749. 
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“Navajo” and “Navaho” names in its product 
line, or in connection with the sale of its goods, 
online, in its catalogs, and in its physical stores. 
Defendant’s use has included, and includes (but 
is not limited to): clothing, jewelry, footwear, 
handbags, caps, scarves, gloves, undergarments, 
and flasks. Defendant’s items sold under the 
“Navajo” and “Navaho” names and marks 
evoke the Navajo Nation’s tribal patterns, 
including geometric prints and designs 
fashioned to mimic and resemble Navajo 
Indian-made patterned clothing, jewelry and 
accessories. Urban Outfitters has sold and is 
selling over 20 products using the “Navajo” and 
“Navaho” trademarks in its retail stores, its 
catalogs, and its online stores.17 
 
*** 
 
 41. Urban Outfitters began offering 
retail clothing and accessories as early as March 
2009 with the “Navajo” and “Navaho” as 
trademarks to label or describe its products. For 
example, a “Leather Navajo cuff” was offered 
on Urban Outfitters’ website in January 2010. 
Sometime in early 2011, and possibly earlier, 
Urban Outfitters started a product line of 20 or 
more items containing the NAVAJO trademark, 
which Defendant sold on its website and in 
retail stores. True and correct copies of 
Defendants’ more than 20 items comprising the 
                                              
17 J.A. at 759. 
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“Navajo Collection” sold at Urban Outfitters, as 
they are or have been displayed for online 
marketing and retailing at Defendant’s website, 
are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit A. 
[FN 5] Exhibit A is an illustrative, and not 
exhaustive, list of Urban Outfitters infringing 
activity. Indeed, Exhibit A only includes screen 
shots from online shopping websites. Urban 
Outfitters sold its goods in physical stores and 
in catalogs, and this has also infringed on the 
Navajo Nation’s marks. 
[FN 5] These PDF images were copied from 
Defendant’s website on October 16, 2011. 18 
 
*** 
 
 78. At least since March 16, 2009, 
and possibly earlier as discovery will confirm, 
and continuously thereafter to the present date, 
Defendant has advertised, marketed, offered, 
displayed for sale, and sold goods in manners 
that falsely suggested they are Indian-made, an 
Indian product, a product of an Indian Tribe, or 
the product of an Indian arts and crafts 
organization resident within the United States, 
including Indian products consisting of jewelry 
and clothing in a traditional Indian style, printed 
design, or medium.19 
 
                                              
18 J.A. at 760-61. 
19 J.A. at 772. 
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 Citing a lack of chronological specificity in Navajo 
Nation’s allegations, Urban Outfitters urges us to use 
extrinsic evidence to determine whether Hanover owes a duty 
to defend.  We decline for two reasons.  First, and most 
importantly, Pennsylvania law provides that the determination 
of a duty to defend depends on the language of the policy and 
the allegations of the complaint20 -- not on extrinsic evidence. 
 
 Second, the premise underpinning Urban Outfitters’ 
advocacy of extrinsic evidence is misguided.  A complaint 
that features few details as to when the plaintiff was wronged 
is far from exceptional.  On the contrary, allegations more 
chronologically cryptic than Navajo Nation’s frequently form 
the basis of advertising injury claims.21  To abandon the 
underlying complaint whenever a plaintiff neglects to provide 
a date-certain tortious conduct timeline would occasion more 
protracted disputes by eroding the predictability that reliance 
on a single pleading ensures.22 
 
 Confining our review to the contents of the underlying 
complaint, we find Navajo Nation’s description of Urban 
Outfitters’ allegedly infringing conduct remarkably 
                                              
20 See Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91. 
21 See, e.g., Transp. Ins. Co. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 346 
F. App’x 862, 863 (3d Cir. 2009); Maddox v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins., 179 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528-29 (W.D. Pa. 2001); 
Applied Bolting Tech. Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 
Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029, 1031-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
22 It might be another matter if the facts known to the insurer 
and those alleged in the complaint were in conflict.  But since 
neither insurer alleges such a factual conflict here, we decline 
to opine on that decidedly more difficult scenario. 
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consistent.  Thus, according to Navajo Nation, Urban 
Outfitters advertised goods in a manner violative of its 
trademark 
 
 “[s]ince at least March 16, 2009” (¶ 2); 
 “[a]t least as early as March 16, 2009” (¶ 37); 
 “as early as March 2009” (¶ 41); and 
 “[a]t least since March 16, 2009, and possibly earlier 
as discovery will confirm, and continuously thereafter 
to the present date” (¶ 78). 
 
In each instance, Navajo Nation fixed March 16, 2009 (if not 
earlier) as a start date for Urban Outfitters’ alleged 
misconduct.  Under the terms of the Hanover policies’ “prior 
publication” exclusions, we must treat this date of “first 
publication” as a landmark.23  Because Hanover was not 
responsible for Urban Outfitters’ liability insurance coverage 
until sixteen months thereafter, the exclusions apply—that is, 
unless the underlying complaint contains allegations of “fresh 
wrongs” that occurred during Hanover’s policy periods. 
 
B. 
 There is no binding authority in this Court on what 
constitutes a “fresh wrong.”  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, however, recently considered the question on 
analogous facts.  In Street Surfing, LLC v. Great American E 
& S Insurance Co., the court defined “fresh wrongs” as “new 
matter,” which in turn “is material not ‘substantially similar’ 
                                              
23 See, e.g., Applied Bolting, 942 F. Supp. at 1036. 
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to the material published before the coverage period.”24  The 
court emphasized that “courts have not considered all 
differences between pre-coverage and post-coverage 
publications, but have focused on the relationship between the 
alleged wrongful acts manifested by those publications.  A 
post-coverage publication is ‘substantially similar’ to a pre-
coverage publication if both publications carry out the same 
alleged wrong.”25 
 
 The insurer in Street Surfing was excused from its duty 
to defend despite differences in pre- and post-coverage 
advertisements.  Although the ads featured different products, 
the advertising idea was the same regardless of the product:  
the products all used the allegedly infringing identification 
“Street Surfing.”  The Ninth Circuit held that the post-
coverage ads were not “fresh wrongs” because (1) the 
underlying plaintiff did not “allege that the post-coverage 
advertisements were separate torts occurring during the policy 
period” and (2) the advertisements “arose out of each term’s 
similarity to [plaintiff’s] advertising idea.”26 
 
 We find this approach persuasive but we will attempt 
to build on it.  Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]n insurer’s duty 
to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.”27  However, 
reasonable limits may be imposed on that broad duty, as for 
instance in cases of alleged advertising harm.  There, the prior 
                                              
24 See Street Surfing, LLC v. Great Am. E & S Ins. Co., 776 
F.3d 603, 612 (9th Cir. 2014). 
25 Id. at 612-13. 
26 Id. at 614. 
27 Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 
526, 540 (Pa. 2010). 
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publication exclusion serves to limit the coverage for an 
ongoing course of wrongful conduct.  Nevertheless, if a new 
infringement has superseded the original infraction, the 
insurers (and courts) must distinguish between “fresh 
wrongs” and mere variations on a theme.   
 
 As with the duty to defend, the allegations in the 
underlying complaint control.28  Where a plaintiff alleges a 
substantive difference between allegedly infringing 
advertisements, published before and during the relevant 
policy period, the later advertisements are “fresh wrongs” that 
fall outside the “prior publication” exclusion.  But variations, 
occurring within a common, clearly identifiable advertising 
objective, do not give rise to “fresh wrongs.” 
 
 When a purported advertising violation stems from 
such common, clearly identifiable objectives, the “prior 
publication” exclusion applies to excuse an insurer from its 
duty to defend if that insurer has assumed coverage 
responsibility after the insured has commenced the liability-
triggering conduct.  In determining whether two or more sets 
of advertisements share a common objective, courts may look 
to whether the plaintiff charged the insured with separate torts 
or an agglomeration.29  Other significant, factors include 
whether the complaint describes a significant lull between 
pre- and post-coverage advertising initiatives and whether the 
                                              
28 See Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91. 
29 See Street Surfing, 776 F.3d at 614. 
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advertisements share a common theme relating to the alleged 
violation.30 
 
 Urban Outfitters stands accused of an apparently 
continuous string of trademark infringement and related 
violations.  In the underlying complaint, where Navajo Nation 
affixed dates to Urban Outfitters’ purported misconduct, the 
dates were generally accompanied by qualifiers denoting 
continuity (e.g., Urban Outfitters has infringed “since” or 
“[a]t least as early as” March 2009).  Navajo Nation provided 
more chronological specificity only in describing particular 
Urban Outfitters advertisements which fit the alleged pattern 
of infringement.  Thus, it alleged, “[f]or example,” that Urban 
Outfitters offered certain infringing products on its website in 
January 2010 and in retail stores as well “[s]ometime in early 
2011, and possibly earlier.”31  Navajo Nation attached screen 
shots of the later product line as an exhibit to its complaint, 
but cautioned that it was “an illustrative, and not exhaustive, 
list of Urban Outfitters infringing activity.”32 
 
 We may not infer from Navajo Nation’s attachment of 
only post-coverage advertisements as exhibits that those 
advertisements substantively differed from pre-coverage ads.  
                                              
30 The Seventh Circuit has analyzed the “prior publication” 
exclusion under a different framework.  See Taco Bell Corp. 
v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1072-74 (2004).  To the 
extent Taco Bell requires that pre- and post-coverage 
advertisements be identical (or nearly identical) for the “prior 
publication” exclusion to apply, we disagree that the 
exclusion demands such rigor. 
31 See supra note 17. 
32 Id. 
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In fact, taking Navajo Nation’s complaint as true compels the 
opposite conclusion.33  Navajo Nation did not charge Urban 
Outfitters with committing separate torts before and during 
Hanover’s coverage period.  Nor did it hint at a hiatus in 
Urban Outfitters’ tortious pursuits between March 2009 and 
the complaint’s filing.  Navajo Nation alleged that Urban 
Outfitters “started using the ‘Navajo’ and ‘Navaho’ names” 
via all relevant instrumentalities of infringement (use “in its 
product line, or in connection with the sale of its goods, 
online, in its catalogs, and in its physical stores”) well before 
Hanover’s coverage period commenced.34  Moreover, the 
“Leather Navajo cuff” offered on Urban Outfitters’ website in 
January 2010 (six months before Hanover’s coverage period 
                                              
33 Similarly, we reject Urban Outfitters’ suggestion that, 
because Navajo Nation’s allegations “lump defendants 
together and are insufficiently specific to determine the 
precise allegations directed against each individual 
defendant,” the court must inquire further as to “the precise 
claims against each insured.”  In the very first sentence of its 
complaint, Navajo Nation alleges that it “brings this 
Amended Complaint against Urban Outfitters, Inc., and its 
wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries, entities, and retail 
brands (collectively ‘Urban Outfitters’ or ‘Defendant’).”  J.A. 
at 748.  Urban Outfitters accurately contends that Navajo 
Nation did not distinguish thereafter between the various 
defendants, but that is precisely the point:  Navajo alleged 
that each Urban Outfitters affiliate engaged in the same 
course of wrongful conduct.  It is not our task to discern the 
plausibility of Navajo Nation’s allegations.  On the contrary, 
we are required to take them at face value.  See 
Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91. 
34 See supra note 16. 
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began) appears thematically consistent with the more than 
twenty post-coverage advertising examples Navajo Nation 
identified.35 
 
 It is apparent from Navajo Nation’s complaint that 
Urban Outfitters’ advertisements, which predated Hanover’s 
coverage period, share a common objective with those that 
followed.  Thus, we conclude that the latter ads are not “fresh 
wrongs.”  The “prior publication” exclusions apply, and 
Hanover has no duty to defend Urban Outfitters in the 
underlying action. 
 
IV. 
 Risk is a concept with which we are intimately 
acquainted.36  Those who wager correctly are rewarded and 
those who guess wrong suffer losses.  The purpose of 
insurance is to disperse that risk.  But “[a]n insured cannot 
insure against something that has already begun and which is 
known to have begun.”37  The “prior publication” exclusion 
prevents a continuing tortfeasor from passing the risk for its 
misconduct on to an unwitting insurer.  Taking Navajo 
Nation’s underlying allegations as true, Urban Outfitters 
engaged in similar liability-triggering behavior both before 
                                              
35 See J.A. at 786-809. 
36 As early as the sixteenth century, popular English proverbs 
cautioned of risk and its vagaries in terms familiar to present 
usage.  See, e.g., Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in 
England, 1500-1700, 140-41 (2000). 
37 See Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 
203 F. Supp. 2d 704, 716 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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and during Hanover’s coverage period.  We therefore hold 
that the exclusion applies.   
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting Hanover’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
